Taking the  Force  out of Enforcement: Giving Effect to International Human Rights Law Using Domestic Immigration Law by Smiley, Susannah
COMMENT
TAKING TIlE "FORCE" OUT OF ENFORCEMENT: GIvING
EFFECT TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW USING
DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION LAW
INTRODUCTION
An estimated 75 percent of all refugees and displaced per-
sons are female. As women, as girls, as mothers, they bear
the brunt of the most egregious forms of human rights
abuse, from mass rape and torture to the sale of children.
Human rights abuses against refugee women do not abate
upon flight or resettlement in neighboring countries....
Often, women refugees are subjected to multiple rapes, in-
cluding vicious gang rapes, and are held apart from their
families in inhumane conditions that are isolated from in-
ternational refugee practitioners and advocates.'
The journey of refugee women to safety and asylum is a long one,
plagued with dangers and struggles only some of which are described
above.' This journey illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the interna-
tional human rights regime. A refugee's very existence illustrates the weak-
ness: no state can be compelled to follow international human rights law.' It
also, however, illustrates the strength of international human rights law: the
victims of human rights abuses have the means, through the mechanism of
asylum," to escape the abuse.
This comment explores a broader perspective on the enforcement of in-
ternational human rights law using the example of women refugees. The fo-
cus is on the use of domestic asylum law to enforce provisions of interna-
1. Sima Wali, Human Rights for Refugee and Displaced Women, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 336 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper
eds., 1995) [hereinafter WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS].
2. See id.; see also United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: Declaration
and Platform for Action, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 401 (1996) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
The Declaration states women "continue to be vulnerable to violence and exploitation while
in flight, in countries of asylum and resettlement and during and after repatriation." Id. at
136.
3. See Beijing Declaration, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that in situations of armed con-
flict, which generate refugees, international human rights law is often ignored).
4. See infra Part II.
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tional human rights law. Part I discusses common criticisms of international
human rights law. Part II examines current United States asylum policy and
the particular difficulties female asylum seekers face within the domestic
immigration framework. Part III integrates United States immigration and
international law, and explores how a broad perspective is useful in analyz-
ing the international enforcement of human rights.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF "ENFORCEMENT"
Because of its limitations, some critics question the effectiveness of in-
ternational law. Skeptics question the legitimacy of international law in gen-
eral, and international human rights law in particular.5 International human
rights law involves a delicate balance of the values of human dignity and
state sovereignty. Scholars and students debate which value should take
precedence in our increasingly interdependent international system."
A landmark decision of the International Court of Justice gave fuel to
the debate. In Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua,7 these competing values clashed Nicaragua brought a
complaint in the World Court against the United States alleging the former
had violated principles of international law when it armed contras against the
Nicaraguan government.9 The United States defended on the theory of col-
lective self-defense, ° arguing that the Nicaraguan government was violating
the human rights of its citizens, and as such, the United States was entitled to
use force against the Nicaraguan government to stop the abuses." The court
disagreed. 2
In finding that the United States was not entitled to use force to compel
compliance with international human rights law, the court analogized human
rights treaty law to conventional contract law. 3 As such, the court found that
Nicaragua had not undertaken any formal, legally-enforceable obligation to
5.. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really Law?, 79 Nw. U. L. REv.
1293 (1984) (discussing common criticisms of international law); Caroline Dommen, The UN
Human Rights Regime: Is it Effective?, 9 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 460 (1997) (discussing
strengths and weaknesses of UN human rights regime and suggesting improvements for fu-
ture).
6. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
7. (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
8. See id. at 129-35 (discussion of the use of force against Nicaraguan government).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 134-35. In fact, the United States refused to appear before the Court,
claiming the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. See id. at 16-17. The Court found it
did have jurisdiction and held public hearings on the issues; the United States was not repre-
sented at those hearings. See id. at 18.
11. See id. at 129-30.
12. See id. at 132-34.
13. See id. at 132 ("[T]he resolution [to allow Nicaraguans democratic participation in
government] is a mere statement which does not comprise any formal offer which if accepted
would constitute a promise in law.").
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institute a particular (democratic) form of government. 4 Furthermore, the
court found that even if Nicaragua had bound itself legally, the United States
did not have standing to enforce the obligation. 5 However, assuming the
United States did have standing to enforce the obligation, the only appropri-
ate enforcement mechanisms are those defined in the agreement. 6 In this
case, the use of force was not authorized. 7 The court stated, "[oif its nature,
a commitment like this is one of a category which, if violated, cannot justify
the use of force against a sovereign State."' 8
Central to the court's holding in Nicaragua was the underlying principle
of state sovereignty. 9 The court found, "[e]very State possesses a funda-
mental right to choose and implement its own political, economic, and social
systems."2 The court did qualify this right, stating that decisions on internal
affairs are within the State's "exclusive jurisdiction, provided of course that
it does not violate any obligation of international law."'" In the view of the
court, however, such obligations arose only through some affirmative act on
the part of the State." Absent clear proof that Nicaragua had consented to a
limitation on this fundamental right, the court would not disturb the State's
autonomy.23
The Nicaragua court received much criticism for its formalistic ap-
proach to the case.' One scholar complained, "the [Nicaragua] judgment has
dealt a blow to the much needed strengthening of human rights in the
Americas."22 Criticisms such as these, and in fact the United States' position
in the matter, illustrate this problem: our conception of enforcement of the
law tends to involve physical coercion or the power of the courts to compel
certain behavior.
"Enforcement," however, has many forms. Critics and supporters of in-
ternational law alike tend to focus on enforcement as physical coercion or
another type of sanction designed to punish the wrongdoer. A narrow un-
derstanding of the term enforcement leads many to disregard the significant
progress already made in the enforcement of international human rights.27 By
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 133.
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 131-32.
20. Id. at 131.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 131-32.
24. See, e.g., Fernando R. Teson, Le Peuple, C'est Moi! The World Court and Human
Rights, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 173 (1987); Theodor Meron, The Nicaragua Judgment, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 25-37 (1989).
25. Teson, supra note 24, at 183.
26. See D'Amato, supra note 5, at 1303-05.
27. See, e.g., Dommen, supra note 5; D'Amato, supra note 5, at 1303-05.
1999]
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broadening the definition, recognition is given not only to the progress that
already has been made, but to the possibilities still available to domestic
courts in the enforcement of international law.28
Black's Law Dictionary defines "enforce" as "to make effective. '29 En-
forcement should not be confined to a notion of "punishment" or "coercion"
against the actual or potential lawbreaker. Instead, enforcement should be
defined as "any mechanism by which the law is made effective."' The lack
of a world court with compulsory jurisdiction and an international police
force does not nullify the efficacy of international human rights law. "[I]t
simply means that international law is enforced in a different way."31
II. WOMEN AND UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
Under United States law, there are two elements of a successful asylum
claim. First, the applicant must show that she 32 meets the definition of "refu-
gee" in the Immigration and Nationality Act.3 3 United States immigration
law defines "refugee" as one who has left her home country and is unable or
unwilling to return "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
28. See infra notes 31, see also infra Part III.D.
29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990).
30. Id.
31. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 1312-13 (emphasis added). International human rights
law, in particular, demands creativity in the concept of law and how it is enforced. Human
rights are unique in international law because they do not deal with inter-state relations, but
rather with the relationship between the individual and the state. See generally Jo M. Pasqua-
lucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing Precedents and Procedure in
Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297 (1995) (discussing development of
international human rights law). Therefore, it seems appropriate when engaging in human
rights discourse to have a definition of "enforcement" that takes the victim into account. See
id. At the domestic level, the analogy can be made to constitutional and civil rights. Arguably,
the most significant remedy available for a violation of these rights is equitable relief in the
form of an injunction, which affords the victim freedom from further violation. See generally
Joseph T. McLaughlin & Harmeet K. Dillon, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in the Federal
Courts, 540 PLI/Lit 503 (1996). Similarly, victims of human rights violations should have
recourse to a remedy that, more importantly than compensating for harms already incurred,
provides freedom from further abuse. "[E]ven in those rare instances when practices that ef-
fect the subordination of women are conceded to be human rights violations, victims often
have no relief." Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights -
Rules, Realities, and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605,
650-51 (1996). Asylum can, and does, provide this redress by insulating the victim from tor-
ture and persecution. Asylum, as a unique form of redress, is appropriate to the particular
needs of victims of human rights violations and persecution because it takes the victim into
account. See generally Deborah Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer?, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 771 (1995).
32. Feminine pronouns are used, not only because the focus of this paper is on women
refugees, but also because most of the world's refugees are female. See Gender-Related Per-
secution: An Analysis of Recent Trends, in INT'L J. REF. L. SPECIAL ISSUE ON GENDER-BASED
PERSECUTION 79, 80 (1997) [hereinafter Gender-Related Persecution]. See also Anker, supra
note 31, at 771.
33. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1994).
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cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."3 ' The very definition of refugee encom-
passes several important human rights so fundamental to the American con-
cept of justice35 that those who are deprived of them are entitled to asylum in
this country." "The municipal law of virtually all countries guarantees the
rights of their citizens to life, liberty, equality, property, due process, etc.
The mere existence of refugees.., shows that their own governments have
violated these rights."'37
The second element of the asylum claim is a discretionary grant of asy-
lum by an immigration administrator once a showing of eligibility is made."
To satisfy her burden, the applicant must show that she has either suffered
past persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution. "[A]n
alien possesses a well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable person in
her circumstances would fear persecution if she were to be returned to her
native country.""' Further, she must show a causal link between the persecu-
tion and her race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or membership in a
particular social group." The applicant must produce objective evidence that
the government routinely subjects members of her group to persecution.
A. Women as a Particular Social Group
Gender-based asylum claims have been most successful when based on
membership in a particular social group. 3 Although no court "has so far pro-
duced a coherent, cogent, approach valid for all times and places,"" some
United States courts have articulated broad guidelines to assist in the adjudi-
34. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedom of religion and association); amend. V (due pro-
cess); amend. XIV (freedom from racial discrimination and equal protection of the law).
36. The United States is one of several countries with a similar definition of refugee and
a similar approach to asylum law. Many states have drawn statutory definitions of "refugee"
from the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and the 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial Asy-
lum. See generally GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-9 (2d ed.
1996).
37. Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 532, 538 (1986).
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14 (a), (b), (e) (1998).
39. See id. § 208.13 (b).
40. M.A. v. INS, 858 F.2d 210, 213 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786
F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986)).
41. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(l-2).
42. See M.A., 858 F.2d at 314.
43. See Gender-Related Persecution, supra note 32, at 105.
44. GOODWN-GILL, supra note 36, at 365. Goodwin-Gill further notes that such a con-
crete definition would probably be incompatible with the idea of asylum. "The individualized
approach of the Convention refugee definition requires attention to personal circumstances,
time and place, all of which may combine to distinguish those at risk from others who may
share similar characteristics and yet not be in danger." Id.
1999]
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cation of asylum claims. '
A particular social group may be a voluntary association of individuals
united by a common belief or set of beliefs.4 '6 The First Circuit held in Ge-
bremichael v. INS47 that where membership in a particular social group is the
claimed grounds for asylum, the applicant must show that "membership...
is at the root of persecution, such that membership itself generates a specific
threat to the [applicant].'4B It is unclear whether women fall into this cate-
gory.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recognized in In re Acosta49
that women may constitute a "particular social group," because gender is an
"immutable characteristic" which defines the group."0 Nevertheless, most
courts have been reluctant to grant asylum to an applicant on the sole basis
of her gender. For example, the Second Circuit, six years after Acosta, held
that "[p]ossession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender
will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular
group."51
Most American courts have been unwilling to create a blanket rule that
women comprise a particular social group. The courts, maintaining a rela-
tivist stance,52 agree that for purposes of asylum law, mere social or legal
45. See generally Gender-Related-Persecution, supra note 32, at 108-10 (discussing le-
gal problems faced by women refugees); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)
(identifying a three-pronged approach to determining refugee status on particular social group
grounds); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1993) (defining particular social group);
In re Acosta, 19 I.&N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Moghar-
rabi, 19 I.&N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987) (defining particular social group).
46. See generally Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986) (defining "par-
ticular social group"); see also In re Acosta, 19 I.&N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985); Safaie v. INS,
25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994); Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991); Ananeh-
Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985), Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.
1993).
47. 10F.3d28 (lstCir. 1993).
48. Id. at 35 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 626-
27).
49. 191.&N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
50. See id. at 233.
51. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("Persecution on account of sex is not included as a category allowing
[asylum] relief."). The inconsistency stems from conflicting perspectives in international hu-
man rights law, as seen in Nicaragua. For some, known as universalists, human rights norms
transcend cultural boundaries; for others, known as cultural relativists, a universal definition
of human rights infringes on a State's right to autonomy. See Judith Hippler Bello & Linda A.
Malone, International Decision: In re Kasinga, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 140, 142 (1997). While
cultural relativism, particularly on social issues, and its corresponding respect for State sover-
eignty remains popular with most courts, see, for example, Nicaragua and Gomez, there is
also increasing support for universalism. See Robert J. Beck, International Law and Interna-
tional Relations: The Prospects for Interdisciplinary Collaboration, 1 J. INT'L L. STUD. 119,
131 (1995). Beck notes, "[a]s the world's transactions-be they economic, environmental,
cultural, military, political, or social -increasingly transcend national boundaries, so the util-
ity of the concept of the sovereign state diminishes." Id.
52. See supra note 51.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1999], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol29/iss2/5
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
discrimination does not rise to the level of persecution. 3 Perhaps this is be-
cause most cultures around the world treat women as second-class citizens.'
"The United Nations Human Development Report 1995 states the shocking,
but all-too-well known fact quite plainly: 'In no society today do women
enjoy the same opportunities as men."'55 This is true despite several interna-
tional instruments which provide for equal treatment of women.56
There are instances, however, where the discrimination is so severe that
gender can, in fact, pose a specific threat of persecution.' Certain human
rights violations are particular to women, or at least are experienced far more
frequently by women than by men. These include rape, sexual abuse, genital
mutilation, forced abortion, and domestic violence.5" Such abuses constitute
persecution. 9 "Severe sexual abuse does not differ analytically from beat-
ings, torture, or other forms of physical violence that are commonly held to
amount to persecution. '
Although gender discrimination is not a recognized ground for asylum,
American and Canadian courts are recognizing particularly egregious gen-
53. See Fisher, 79 F.3d at 961-62 (citing Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir.
1995)); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240 ("the concept of persecution does not encompass all treatment
that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.").
54. See Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 31, at 607.
55. See id.; see also United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, 19 I.L.M. 33, 35 (1980) ("despite [instruments promoting gen-
der equality] extensive discrimination continues to exist") [hereinafter Convention for the
Elimination of Discrimination]; Beijing Declaration, 35 I.L.M. at 407 ("[T]he status of
women has advanced in some important respects in the past decade but.., progress has been
uneven, inequalities between women and men have persisted and major obstacles remain.").
56. See, e.g., Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination, supra note 55; Beijing
Declaration, supra note 2. See generally NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1983) (reprinting and discussing several important international
treaties and UN documents relating to the rights of women).
57. See generally WOMEN's RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1.
58. Hemandez-Truyol, supra note 31, at 610, 634-37. Although the article states that
"women's rights are human rights," there is little doubt that human rights violations such as
bride-burning, foot-binding, face-hiding, forced pregnancy, and forced abortion are suffered
by women exclusively. Other violations, such as domestic violence, genital mutilation, gen-
der-based infanticide and sexual exploitation are suffered primarily by women. See id.; see
also G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/629, reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
1049 (1994); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE,
Recommendation and Report on Women's Human Rights, 30 INT'L LAW 867, 870 (1996)
("the human rights of women and girls are not a separate or special category of rights, but an
integral and indivisible part of international human rights."); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 36,
at 364 ("[W]omen suffer particular forms of persecution as women, and not just or specifi-
cally because of political opinion or ethnicity."); Jane Connors, Legal Aspects of Women as a
Particular Social Group, INT'L J. REF. L. SPECIAL ISSUE: GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION
115, 117 (1997) ("[T]here are some harms which are experienced disproportionately by
women that are... [an] egregious and outrageous ... denial of international human rights.")
[hereinafter SPECIAL ISSUE].
59. See generally INS Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims
from Women, reprinted in Anker, supra note 3 1, at 794 [hereinafter INS Guidelines].
60. Id. at 804.
1999]
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der-based violence as persecution with increasing frequency."' Recent devel-
opments in immigration law, discussed below, indicate that asylum law is
being used effectively to combat these abuses, both in providing relief for
the victim and creating international pressure on the abuser to stop the abuse.
Thus, although general inequality among the sexes is not recognized as a
ground for asylum, extreme examples of gender-based violence are being
identified as persecution. 2 By allowing for the grant of asylum to women
who have suffered extreme discrimination and mistreatment, immigration
law works as a domestic institution enforcing international law, which for-
bids these kinds of human rights abuses.63
B. Feminists as a Particular Social Group
In order to use membership in such a group as a ground for asylum, the
applicant must show that the common belief "is so fundamental to the indi-
vidual's identity or conscience that.., she ought not be required to
change."' Feminism is defined as the belief that women should have rights
and opportunities equal to those of men in the same culture or society.' A
woman's belief that she is entitled certain rights is fundamental to her self-
esteem and identity.' Thus, feminists may be understood as a particular so-
cial group.
"Particular social group" lacks a clear definition, in part because this
ground for asylum, added as an afterthought to the UN Convention on Refu-
61. See generally SPECIAL ISSUE, supra note 58.
62. See generally id.
63. See Elissavet Stamatopolou, Women's Rights and the United Nations, in WOMEN's
RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 36-37.
64. Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640 (citing Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at 626).
65. See Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination, supra note 52, at Art. 3 ("to
ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing
them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of
equality with men"), Art. 15 ("accord to women equality with men before the law"); Beijing
Declaration, supra note 2, at 407 ("Women's empowerment and their full participation on the
basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making proc-
ess and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development, and
peace.").
66. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241-42 (citing Acosta, 19 I.&N. Dec. at 234); see also Beijing
Declaration, supra note 2, at 407. The declaration notes that fundamental freedoms such as
freedom of thought, religion, and belief contribute to the moral and spiritual well-being of the
individual. See id. It further states that these freedoms benefit not only the individual but the
community as well. See id. The declaration later states:
Women have the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal and mental health. The enjoyment of this right is vital to their life and well-
being and their ability to participate in all areas of public and private life. Health is
a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the ab-
sence of disease or infirmity.
Id. at 423.
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gees,67 was meant as a catch-all.68 Feminism is a characteristic that may de-
fine a social group, or it may be considered a political opinion.'
Three appellate courts have recognized that feminists are a particular
social group.70 However, these courts have limited the definition of "femi-
nists" to include only those women whose beliefs in gender equality are so
strong that they would risk severe punishment to express them. 7' All three
cases concerned Iranian women who were opposed to the strict dress codes
imposed on them by their government. 7' All three applicants were denied
asylum because not one could demonstrate that her beliefs were "so pro-
found that she would choose to suffer the consequences of noncompli-
ance."
73
It is worth mentioning here that the "consequences of noncompliance"
include "74 lashes, a year's imprisonment, and in many cases brutal rapes
and death. ' 7' The requirement that a woman risk death to show that she is
truly dedicated to the cause of gender equality is overly stringent. Neverthe-
less, the courts have taken a step in the right direction in recognizing femi-
nists as a particular social group.
This step is a small one. Other countries, including Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand, have been quicker to move their asylum policy in line
with their international obligations.7" Although the United States also has in-
stituted more progressive guidelines for adjudicating the asylum claims of
women,76 the demands placed on the applicant remain restrictive.77 With less
stringent demands on the applicant, the argument could be made that United
States asylum law is an effective tool for enforcing a woman's right to fight
for equality. More substantial moves in this direction must be taken before
that will be true.
67. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
68. See Gender-Related Persecution, supra note 32, at 105.
69. See id. at 120-21. For a complete discussion, see infra Part II.C., discussing feminism
as a political opinion.
70. See Fisher, 79 F.3d at 960-62; Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640; Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
71. See Fisher, 79 F.3d at 963; Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640; Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
72. See Fisher, 79 F.3d at 963; Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640; Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
73. Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640; see also Fisher, 79 F.3d at 963; Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242-43.
74. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241.
75. See generally SPECIAL ISSUE, supra note 58. For example, Canada has instituted im-
migration guidelines which recognize gender-based violence as a form of persecution and,
therefore, as a ground for asylum. See Stephanie Kaye Pell, Comment, Adjudication of Gen-
der Persecution Cases Under the Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No Reason to
Fear an Onslaught of Asylum Claims, 20 N.C. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 655, 658 (1995). For a
comparison of immigration approaches taken by the United States, Canada, Germany, and the
United Kingdom, see generally Gregory A. Kelson, Gender-Based Persecution and Political
Asylum: The International Debate for Equality Begins, 6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 181 (1997).
76. See INS Guidelines, supra note 59.
77. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
19991
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C. Feminism as a Political Opinion
A female asylum applicant may also be successful in basing her claim
on her political opinion. One of the appellate courts that discussed feminism
as a social group also found that feminism is a political opinion."8 In Fatin,
the female Iranian applicant had to: (1) identify feminism as a political
opinion; (2) demonstrate that her feminist beliefs were strongly held; and (3)
show that feminists as a group were singled out for persecution in her native
country."9 The court found "the administrative record does not show that Ira-
nian feminists are generally subjected to treatment so harsh that it may accu-
rately be described as persecution""° and thus the applicant's request for
asylum was denied.8
Nonetheless, Fatin was an important milestone in United States immi-
gration law.82 In recognizing feminism as a political opinion, and therefore as
a basis for granting asylum, American courts have finally acknowledged the
importance of women's right to fight for equality internationally.
An earlier Ninth Circuit case made a similar finding. In Lazo-Majano v.
INS, 3 the applicant, Olimpia Lazo-Majano, suffered repeated brutal rapes
and beatings at the hands of her employer, a sergeant in the Salvadoran
Armed Forces." Her persecutor forced her to have intercourse with him by
threatening her with a variety of weapons, from guns to hand grenades to
bombs.85 He also beat and humiliated her on numerous occasions.86 He la-
beled her a "subversive" and told her "it was his job to kill subversives." 7
The court found that the sergeant's "generalized animosity"" toward
women and his belief that women should be subordinate to men constituted
one political opinion.89 To the extent that Olimpia attempted to escape her
78. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242 ("[T]here is little doubt that feminism qualifies as a politi-
cal opinion.").
79. See id.; see also Safaie, 25 F.3d at 639.
80. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242.
81. Id.
82. See Alison E. Graves, Women in Iran: Obstacles to Human Rights and Possible So-
lutions, AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 57, 84 (1996) ("Fatin v. INS was a stepping stone.... It fi-
nally showed an international awareness of repression on the basis of gender persecution.").
83. 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Fisher, 79 F.3d 955.
84. See id. at 1433.
85. See id.
86. See id. Physical and emotional abuse of this sort involves patterns of behavior that
allow the aggressor to establish power and control over the victim. Examples of this behavior
in Lazo-Majano's case, aside from the rapes and beatings, include being dragged by the hair
in public and being forced to eat pieces of her identity card, which her abuser had destroyed.
See id. at 1433. This was not a typical domestic violence situation, however. The abuser's po-
sition in the Salvadoran Army, and his repeated threats to use his position against Olimpia,
were crucial in the determination that she had suffered persecution See id. at 1435.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1435.
89. Id.
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abuser, her attacker perceived this as a contrary political opinion, and the
further rapes and beatings that ensued were found to be persecution on ac-
count of an imputed political opinion.' Based on this reasoning, the court
held, as a matter of law, that Olimpia had suffered persecution because of
political opinion, and that the BIA had abused its discretion in denying her
asylum claim.91
As these cases illustrate, feminism as a political opinion or feminists as
a particular social group can provide a basis for a successful gender-based
asylum claim. By thus affording female victims of human rights abuses a
safe haven, immigration law is a domestic structure that enforces interna-
tional human rights law.
III. COORDINATION: USING DOMESTIC LAW TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL
RIGHTS
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,92 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated,
"[ilt is an ancient and a salutary feature of the Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion that the Law of Nations is a part of the law of the land to be ascertained
and administered, like any other, in the appropriate case."'93 The court went
on to find "federal courts [are open] for the adjudication of rights ... recog-
nized by international law."94 This part addresses whether domestic immi-
gration law can be employed as an enforcement mechanism for international
law.
Perhaps the most concrete and significant example of the use of domes-
tic immigration law to enforce international human rights law is in the area
of women's rights. These rights include physical integrity, freedom of self-
expression, and reproductive choice.' Courts are recognizing with increasing
frequency that female genital mutilation, rape, forced abortions, and other
forms of sexual violence are forms of persecution and torture.96 Recent cases
highlight the legal developments in this area.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1436.
92. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. Id. at 886.
94. Id. at 887; see also Edward D. Re, Human Rights, International Law, and Domestic
Courts, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 20 (1996) ("[A]n independent judiciary must ef-
fectuate and, indeed, when possible, enlarge and expand upon those human rights that have
become universally accepted as indispensable to the dignity of all people.").
95. See Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination, supra note 54, passim.
96. In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (B.I.A. 1996) (granting asylum to African woman who
feared female genital mutilation); Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997) (granting
asylum to victim of sexual harassment and assault); Lazo-Majano, 813 F.3d at 1436 (granting
asylum to rape victim); In re X-P-T-, Int. Dec. 3299 (B.I.A. 1996) (granting asylum to
Chinese woman who had been forcibly sterilized).
1999]
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A. The Right to Physical Integrity and Freedom from Sexual Violence and
Assault
There is no question that the right to be free from rape and sexual as-
sault is a fundamental human right for all womenY The violation of this
right is particularly heinous when the state is either the perpetrator or is un-
willing to punish the perpetrator.9" According to one scholar, "there has been
increasing recognition by governmental and inter-governmental organs that
state-sponsored rape... should rank among the gravest of human rights
violations. Rape, particularly when used as a political weapon, meets the
definition.., of torture."
In Angoucheva v. INS,"° the Seventh Circuit recognized that sexual as-
sault and attempted rape are forms of persecution,' ° and, therefore, form a
basis for a successful asylum claim."° In that case, the Bulgarian applicant,
Natasha Angoucheva, had been arrested for holding a Macedonian inde-
pendence meeting at her apartment. 3 During the subsequent interrogation,
the interrogating officer insinuated that "if she was good to him, he would
not report her to... the State Security Office."'" At that point, he locked the
doors to the office, turned off the lights, and molested her sexually. 5 He was
interrupted by an urgent telephone call,"° and both the applicant and the
court felt that this telephone call was the only thing that saved her from
forcible rape at the hands of her interrogator."l
The Angoucheva court made clear that sexual molestation and harass-
ment were rights violations entitled to redress in the form of political asy-
lum. ' 8 The court explicitly rejected the INS's contention that sexual assault
by an interrogating officer did not constitute persecution at the hands of a
government actor, or someone the government could not or would not con-
trol."l In remanding to the BIA for further examination, the court noted that
"it could be that the assault was inextricably linked to Bulgarian govern-
ment's disapproval of Angoucheva's [political] activities."'' 0
97. See Anker, supra note 31, at 782.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. 106 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1997).
101. See id. at 790.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 785-86.
104. Id. at 786.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 786, 790.
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B. The Right to Self-Expression
The INS Guidelines.. recognize that in certain countries, social norms
concerning women's dress and behavior are often imposed to the point of
depriving women of their rights."'
Breaching social mores (e.g., marrying outside an arranged marriage,
wearing lipstick, or failing to comply with other cultural or religious
norms) may result in harm, abuse or harsh treatment that is distinguishable
from the treatment given the general population, frequently without
meaningful recourse to state protection. As a result, the civil, political, so-
cial and economic rights of women are often diminished in these coun-
tries."'3
Two interesting examples illustrate how domestic immigration law can
be used to restore the rights of these women: Iranian women who do not
conform to Muslim dress and behavior codes, and Russian lesbians who
choose to be open about their sexuality.
In Fatin,"' the court found that Iranian women who did not agree with
the strict dress and behavior codes in that country could constitute a particu-
lar social group."5 The applicant testified that in addition to the statutory
one-year imprisonment, women who refused to wear the chador"6 were also
often whipped or stoned in public.' The court agreed that "the indicated
consequences of non-compliance would constitute persecution.""' Moreo-
ver, it noted that the punishments suffered by non-conforming Iranian
women could amount to persecution." 9
The Ninth Circuit expressed similar views in Fisher v. INS.' In Fisher,
the applicant stated she feared punishment for not following the Iranian
dress code.' Although the court ultimately found Fisher ineligible for asy-
111. INS Guidelines, supra note 59.
112. ld. at798.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. 12 F.3d at 1233. This case was discussed earlier in relation to its findings as to
women and feminism as a social group, and feminism as a political opinion. See supra, Part
II.
115. Id. at 1242-43. The court held, nevertheless, that the applicant did not satisfy the
requirements for a granting of asylum. In the court's opinion, the applicant had not demon-
strated that her objections to the dress code were so strong that she would risk harsh punish-
ment and violate them. See id. at 1241-42; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
116. A chador is a veil that covers the face entirely, except for slits for the eyes. See
Alison E. Graves, Women in Iran: Obstacles to Human Rights and Possible Solutions, AM. U.
J. GENDER & L. 57, 70 (1996). Women in Iran are required to wear such veils because of the
religious belief that "the appearance of an unveiled woman in public is an attack on... the
morality of the Muslim community." Id.
117. See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1236.
118. Id. at 1242.
119. See id.
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lum,"' it also stated that the applicant "may suffer persecution on account of
her religious beliefs as a result of Iran's enforcement of its conduct and dress
rules."'23
In a convincing and well-reasoned dissent from the denial of asylum,
Justice Noonan noted that petitioner had demonstrated that the State viewed
her as a "religious nonconformist."'24 Noonan argued that "the religious be-
liefs imputed to her by the regime were also political opinions, and the per-
secution she fear[ed] from the regime would also be 'on account of those
imputed political opinions."'23
Neither court in the preceding cases found the nonconforming women
eligible for asylum. However, there is indication that courts are ready to
consider asylum as a possibility for women seeking to express themselves in
a way contrary to prevailing cultural and social mores. 26 If this is the case,
domestic law will be an effective means of enforcing the human right of
freedom of expression.
Gay rights activists have also claimed a small but significant victory in
the Ninth Circuit concerning the granting of asylum to homosexuals. In
Pitcherskaia v. INS,27 the petitioner, a lesbian, sought asylum based on the
possibility of being institutionalized to "cure" her homosexuality. 2 ' The
court of appeals reversed the BIA's determination that an asylum applicant
demonstrate her persecutor's subjective intent to punish.' 9 The Russian mi-
litia had subjected Pitcherskaia to interrogation, beatings, and electroshock
therapy."3 The BIA had determined that in doing so, her persecutors were
attempting to "cure" her, and thus "their actions did not constitute 'persecu-
tion' within the meaning of the Act.''
The court rejected this determination, stating "persecution simply re-
quires that the perpetrator cause the victim suffering or harm."'32 On this ba-
sis, the BIA's denial of asylum to Pitcherskaia was reversed.' Pitcherskaia
is a clear example of the court using asylum to give redress to a victim of
human rights abuses. Coupled with Angoucheva, the two cases show a trend
in courts to find official, state-based persecution where earlier courts would
122. Id. at 963.
123. Id. at 960.
124. Id. at 970 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Gender Dimension of U.S. Immigration Policy, 9 YALE J.
L. & FEMINISM 23, 47-48 (1997) (arguing that United States courts are increasingly providing
safe haven for applicants with gender-based claims).
127. 18 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997).
128. See id. at 644-45.
129. See id. at 646, 648.
130. See id. at 644.
131. Id. at645.
132. Id. at 648.
133. See id.
14
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have rejected the applications as merely personal. 3"
C. The Right to Reproductive Choice
A woman's right to reproductive freedom is hotly debated in this coun-
try when it is discussed in terms of the right to an abortion. 3 However, few
would contest that a pregnant woman has the right to carry her pregnancy to
term; nor would they contest the human right to procreate. 3"
These reproductive rights provide possibly the clearest example of how
domestic asylum law is giving effect to international human rights law. Not
only have there been successful asylum claims by Chinese nationals seeking
to protect their reproductive rights,'37 but Congress now has made it easier
for such applicants to gain asylum by enacting the Illegal Immigration and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA or "the Act").
Section 601 of the Act explicitly states "a person who has been forced to
abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization or who has been
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such procedure ... shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion."'39 An ap-
plicant meets her burden of showing persecution by demonstrating she has
been subjected to involuntary abortion or sterilization.' "The new language
seems to establish clearly a per se asylum case by labeling a forced abortion
11141
or involuntary sterilization as persecution on account of political opinion.
Thus, section 601 effectively removes the decision to grant asylum from the
immigration judge's discretion. 4 '
The first case under section 601 was In re X-P-T- ." The applicant
in that case was a Chinese woman who had violated China's one child per
couple mandate.'" She and her husband had three children, after which she
134. See, e.g., Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664-65 (denying asylum to victim of military rapes).
135. See generally Bharati Sadasivam, The Rights Framework in Reproductive Health
Advocacy - A Reappraisal, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 313 (1997) (discussing current inter-
national and domestic issues in reproductive rights).
136. See Beijing Declaration, supra note 2, at 423; Convention for the Elimination of
Discrimination, supra note 55, at art. 12, 16.
137. In re X-P-T-, Int. Dec. 3299 (B.I.A. 1996); Matter of C-Y-Z-, Int. Dec. 3319
(B.I.A. 1997).
138. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208 § 601 (stating that any foreign national who has undergone forced abortion or sterili-
zation has been "persecuted").
139. Id. § 601.
140. Id. § 601(a)(1).
141. Steven C. Bell, BIA Rejects INS Policy on New Refugee Provision, 16 IMM. L. REP.
Oct. 1, 1997, at 223-24.
142. Seeid.
143. Int. Dec. 3299 (B.I.A. 1996).
144. See id. at 3. The mandate was adopted in late 1979 after a decade-long population
boom. See Anne M. Gomez, The New INS Guidelines on Gender Persecution: Their Effect on
Asylum in the United States for Women Fleeing the Forced Sterilization and Abortion Poli-
1999]
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was forcibly sterilized.'4" The court found, as a matter of law, that under sec-
tion 601, the applicant had suffered past persecution and was thus entitled to
a grant of asylum.'" The court explicitly concluded, "as a result of the
amendments made by section 601 of the IIRIRA, that forcible sterilization is
a basis for grants of asylum.'
'147
By providing this statutory per se asylum claim, Congress has reaf-
firmed that the right to reproductive freedom is a fundamental human right.
Under this statute, victims of China's strict population control measures are
sheltered from persecution.
D. What Effect Does United States Asylum Law Have on International
"Lawbreakers"?
As the foregoing illustrations demonstrate, immigration can be effective
as a direct means of enforcing human rights by providing victims of human
rights abuses with relief from persecution. Immigration law also can have a
more indirect enforcement effect on international law. When refugees bring
asylum claims in domestic court, they increase the world-wide awareness of
particular human rights abuses that occur in their home countries.' 8 As many
feminists and activists agree, raising awareness is the first step to effecting
political change.' 9 Political powerlessness is often a result of "invisibility"
or ignorance of the issues on the part of those in power.'
Women worldwide are rendered invisible and silenced by being killed,
physically abused into submission, and even starved. In addition to such di-
rect physical abuses, women's human rights and freedoms are further im-
periled by the systematic denial of their political, economic, social, civil, and
other legal rights which purportedly ensure women's full participation in the
cultural and political life of the state."
Therefore, increasing visibility is crucial to eradicating abuses.' 2 "The
methodological question remains: how does the human rights community in-
form a group that certain practices violate human rights norms?' ' 3 Asylum
law can fill this communication gap. By its very definition, the term refugee
cies of the People's Republic of China, 21 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 621, 623 (1996). In ac-
cordance with the policy, official quotas are instituted for each local region. See id. Officials
use forced abortions and sterilizations to enforce these quotas. See id.
145. See In re X-P-T-, Int. Dec. 3299 at 3.
146. See id. at 5.
147. Id. at 7.
148. See Beth A. Lubetkin, Violence Against Women and the U.S. Immigration Laws, 90
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 616, 618-19 (1996).
149. See Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 31, at 608-09.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 639.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 674.
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indicates that the individual's country of origin is violating human rights.'-'
"The country that turns its own citizens into refugees is in violation of all the
articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 5 ' By granting asy-
lum to women who have suffered persecution based on their gender, asylum
countries are sending a strong message that the refugee's home country has
violated human rights norms. "'56
As the international community learns of particularly egregious human
rights violations, the pressure increases for the wrongdoer to stop the abuse.
This has been the case with female genital mutilation and forced abortion. 57
In effect, the international community, outraged at the practices of certain
countries, embarrasses the wrongdoer into compliance with international
law.
Critics will argue that if United States courts open themselves to the
adjudication of gender-based asylum claims, a significant portion of the
world's women will seek refuge here, and that the United States cannot sup-
port this inflow of refugees."8 This fear is unfounded.59 The INS has stated
"we do not expect or anticipate a dramatic increase in the number of asylum
claims that are gender-based."'" Other countries with similar approaches to
gender-based claims report no significant rise in the number of gender-based
claims. 6
There are several reasons why this may be the case. As a practical mat-
ter, it takes resources to get to a country of refuge that many, if not most,
refugee women do not possess.'62 In addition, an applicant for asylum from
gender-based persecution still has the burden of showing her case to be true
by a preponderance of the evidence.'63 These obstacles may prove insur-
mountable for the majority of refugees and asylum-seekers.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing that the enforcement of international human rights law is
154. See Connors, supra note 58, at 118.
155. Lee, supra note 37, at 538.
156. See Graves, supra note 82, at 90-91.
157. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (B.I.A. 1996) (granting asylum to potential
victim of female genital mutilation); In re X-P-T-, Int. Dec. 3299 (B.I.A. 1996) (granting
asylum to a woman who had been forcibly sterilized).
158. See Pell, supra note 75, at 656.
159. See Paula Lynch & Lori Scialabba, United States Presentation, in SPECIAL ISSUE,
supra note 58, at 72.
160. Id. at 74.
161. See generally Pell, supra note 75. Since the adoption of its immigration guidelines
recognizing gender-based violence as a form of persecution, Canada has not experienced a
significant increase in the number of asylum claims from women. See id. at 658. Of approxi-
mately 150 gender-based asylum claims brought before the Canadian Immigration and Refu-
gee Board, seventy percent have been granted. See id. at 658 n. 12.
162. See Bello & Malone, supra note 51, at 146.
163. See id. at 141.
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often impeded by competing value systems, there are various options avail-
able in the enforcement of international human rights law. Physical coercion
or jurisdictional power are not required for enforcement.
The use of domestic asylum law is an example of an effective means of
enforcing international human rights. It accomplishes this directly by pro-
viding the victim with a safe haven from human rights abuses. It also ac-
complishes this indirectly by increasing awareness of rights abuses within
the international community, thereby creating pressure for the abuser to stop
the mistreatment.
The use of domestic immigration law in this way allows American
courts to enforce, i.e., give meaning to, international human rights, without
disturbing the balance of humanitarian objectives versus state sovereignty.
This does not suggest that asylum law is sufficient for the enforcement of
international human rights. There must be increased enforcement, in both the
traditional and non-traditional senses of the word.
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